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Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: 
Theory and Evidence from the GCC 
Mohamed Osman Suliman 
Mahmoud Sami Nabi 
Abstract  
 
The theoretical model delves into the relationship between labor market institutions and 
unemployment by proving two propositions: (1) allowing informal activity bolsters  job creation, and (2) 
if the institutional environment is initially, sufficiently, weak, then mitigating it will lower 
unemployment. Simulating the model with the GCC’s unemployment for the period 1990-2007 allows us 
to decipher the validity of the model. The institutional environment is represented in this simulation by 
social insurance which is captured through oil prices. Hence, an increase in oil prices is assumed to lead 
to higher social insurance and, therefore ,to higher cost of hiring labour . The parameters are selected with 
the objective of  minimizing the error gap between the effective unemployment rate  and the simulated 
unemployment rate . The effective unemployment rate is constructed as a weighted average of the 
unemployment rate of nationals and non-nationals. The weights are the shares of national and non-
national labour-force in the GCC countries. Expositional simulations verified the second proposition. 
Thus, improving labor market institutions, that are initially weak may discernibly alleviate unemployment 
problems in   the GCC. 
  ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳ ﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣﻭ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ :ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﰲ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﻈﻨﻟﺍ 
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  ﻲﻫ ﻡﺎﺴﻗﺃ ﺔﻌﺑﺭﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻞﻤﺘﺸﺗ:ﺕﺎﺟﺎﺘﻨﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﻭ ﺓﺎﻛﺎﶈﺍ ﻭ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻭ ﺔﻣﺪﻘﳌﺍ. ﰲ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ ﻖﻓﺍﱰﻟ ﻥﺎﺜﺣﺎﺒﻟﺍ ﺽﺮﻌﺗ ﺔﻣﺪﻘﳌﺍ ﰲ
 ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺪﻌﻣ ﰲ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ ﻊﻣ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﰲ.ﺞﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﺔﻘﻄﻨﻣ ﰲ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺴﺑ ﺔﻘﻠﻌﺘﳌﺍ ﺕﺎﻴﺑﺩﻷﺍ ﺾﻌﺑ ﺽﺮﻋ ﰎ ﺎﻤﻛ. ﻑﺪﳍﺍ ﻥﺎﺜﺣﺎﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺪﺣﻭ
ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﰲ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳ ﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣﻭ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺪﺑ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ.ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻢﺴﻗ ﰲ : ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﻑﺎﺸﻜﺘﺳﺍ ﻥﺎﺜﺣﺎﺒﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺎﳛ
 ﻦﻣ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳ ﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣﻝﻭﻷﺍ ﲔﺿﺍﱰﻓﺍ ﻝﻼﺧ :ﻲ￿ﺎﺜﻟﺍﻭ ،ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺹﺮﻓ ﻖﻠﺧ ﺓﺪ￿ﺎﺴﲟ ﺔﻴﲰﺮﻟﺍ ﲑﻏ ﺔﻄﺸ￿ﻸﻟ ﺡﺎﻤﺴﻟﺍ : ﺔﻴﺴﺳﺆﳌﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺖ￿ﺎﻛ ﺎﻣ ﺍﺫﺇ
ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺪﻌﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺾﻔﺨﻴﺳ ﺎﻬﻨﻴﺴﲢ ﻥﺈﻓ ،ًﺎﻴﺋﺪﺒﻣ ﺔﻔﻴﻌﺿ . ﺓﱰﻔﻠﻟ ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﰲ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺪﻌﻣ  ﻡﺍﺪﺨﺘﺳﺎﺑ ،ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﻛﺎﳏ ﺢﻤﺴﺗﻭ
2007‐1990ﻛﺎﺑ ،ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺣﻼﺻ ﻑﺎﺸﺘ.ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﻝﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻩﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻦﻜﳝ ﻱﺬﻟﺍ ،ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ ﲔﻣﺄﺘﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﻛﺎﶈﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﰲ ﺔﻴﺴﺳﺆﳌﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﻞﺜﳝﻭ .
ﺔﻟﺎﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻞﻴﻐﺸﺘﻟ ﻰﻠﻋﺃ ﺔﻔﻠﻛ ﱃﺇ ﺔﺠﻴﺘﻨﻟﺎﺑﻭ ﻰﻠﻋﺃ ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﺍ ﲔﻣﺄﺗ ﱃﺇ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﰲ ﺓﺩﺎﻳﺯ ﻱﺃ ﺩﻮﻘﺗ ﻥﺃ ﺽﱰﻔﻳ ﻚﻟﺬﺑﻭ.ﲔﺴﲢ ﻥﺃ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻠﻟ ﺓﺎﻛﺎﶈﺍ ﺖﺘﺒﺛﺃ ﺪﻗﻭ 
ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﰲ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻠﻜﺸﻣ ﰲ ﺱﻮﻤﻠﻣ ﺾﻴﻔﲣ ﱃﺇ ﺩﻮﻘﻳ ،ﺎﻴﺋﺪﺒﻣ ﺔﻔﻴﻌﻀﻟﺍ ،ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳ ﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣ.
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1. Introduction
 
 The gush of oil prices in the seventies bolstered the Gulf Cooperation Countries Council 
(GCC) economies. The resulting ubiquitous growth of the GCC paved the way for an influx of 
foreign workers in their labor markets.  However, oil prices tumbled sharply in the mid-eighties. 
The results were manifestly grave on the segmented labor market of the GCC.  Unemployment 
for both national citizens of the Gulf and non-nationals,  drastically, rose to unprecedented levels 
,reaching over  15 percent , for nationals, in some of these countries ( Central Department of 
Statistics, Saudi Arabia, 2000). The policy implications of these shifts in the GCC’s labor 
markets were far-reaching.  The Gulf countries had to change their labor laws to protect their 
national citizens against foreign labor competition. 
 Numerous articles have been written on the nuances of the market segmentation issue of 
labor markets in the GCC and elsewhere. Piore (1979) delved the segmented market for migrant 
workers in industrial societies. Borjas (1994) discussed the economic aspects of  immigration, 
with emphasis on  the impact of Hispanic workers on the United States economy. Bartram (1998) 
wrote on the historical situation of foreign workers in Israel.  Hiebert (1999) highlighted the 
influence of geographical localities on market segmentation in Canada.  Said (2001) , succinctly, 
explored the tendency of the Arab countries to reserve public sector employment to national 
citizens. Ali (2002) examined the relationship between education and the labor market, with 
special emphasis on the measurement of the returns to human capital.   Albuainain (2004) 
reported that , despite the protection of domestic laws to nationals, their unemployment rate is 
actually higher than what the official reports show in Abu Dhabi.  The market segmentation issue 
in the Arab world has been talked , among others, by Zind (2002) and Al-khouli (2007) who 
investigated the labor market  in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 This paper examines the relationship of the labor market institutions and unemployment 
in the GCC. The paper deviates from previous work in several ways. It connects the market 
segmentation idea to the development of formal and informal markets. Empirically,  this study 
simulates the theoretical model with GCC’s unemployment for the period 1990-2007.  
 The next section presents the theoretical model.   Section three examines the simulation 
results. The last section offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model
 
The model is a modified version of Helpman and Itskhoki (2007). It enables the 
institutional environment to affect job creation and therefore the unemployment level. 
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A. Agents 
 
Agents are of two types: workers and stockholders. To present their consumption 
behavior we represent them by a representative agent who consumes a continuum [0,1] of goods 
and which preferences are characterized by the following utility function 
1,)(
1
1
0
<<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∫ βββ odiiCU  (1) 
 
where C(i) denotes the consumption of good i and β is a parameter that controls the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties. The problem of the representative agent is to 
maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint 
∫ =10 )()( PCdiiCiP  (2) 
where p(i) is the price of the variety i, C is the total consumption if the differentiated good and P 
the price index defined as follows 
β
β
β
β
−−
−−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡= ∫
1
1
0
1)( diiPP  (3) 
Denoting R as the revenue of the representative agent we have PC=R, and the demand 
function representing the solution to the consumer maximization problem will be 
β−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 1
1
)()(
P
iP
P
RiC  (4) 
which implies that the demand for each variety depends on the  total expenditure and on 
the relative price of the good p(i)/P. 
B. Firms 
 
The economy contains a continuum of mass 1 monopolistically competitive firms 
distributed on [0,1]. A firm that seeks to supply a good of variety i bears an entry cost which 
covers the technology cost. After bearing this cost, the firm learns how productive its technology 
is, as measured by a parameter θi distributed with a density f(θi) over [ ]θθ ,  where 0>θ .  For 
simplicity we consider a uniform distribution so that we have )/(1)( θθθ −=if . If the 
technology productivity is not sufficiently high some firms find it optimal to move to the 
informal sector of the economy in order to reduce the labour cost. The proportion of formal and 
informal firms will be endogenously determined. Before, we present the production technology. 
A good i producing firm uses labour in quantity hi to produce a quantity y(i) according to the 
following production technology 
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iihiy θ=)(  (5) 
and is constrained by the demand function 
)()( iCiy =  (6) 
In order to rewrite this constraint in equivalent manner note that the representative 
agent’s income R is equal to the production value of firms. Indeed, this production value is 
distributed to workers and stockholders. Hence, we have R= Py where P is the price index given 
by (3) and y is the production index given by  
ββ
1
1
0
)( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡== ∫ diiyCy  (7) 
Using (4) and (7)  the demand constraint (6) becomes 
β−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 1
1
)()(
P
ipyiy   
 
B.1 The formal firms 
 
The formal firms face hiring costs of labor. A firm i that seeks to employ hi workers bears 
the hiring cost bhi where b > 0 is a constant term which measures the degree of frictions in the 
labor market. Higher values of b correspond to countries having low efficient labor market 
institutions. Workers hired by formal firms have a bargaining power in the wage determination 
process.  Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), bargaining between the workers and the formal 
firm leads to the following distribution of revenue: the firm gets a share 1/(1+β) and the workers 
get a share β/(1+β). This result is derived under the assumption that at the bargaining stage a 
worker's outside option is unemployment, and the value of unemployment is normalized to zero 
(no unemployment benefits). Note that since β<1 the share of workers never exceeds the half of 
the revenue.  A firm chooses an employment level that maximizes its share of revenue minus 
hiring costs. That is, it chooses hi to maximize 
i
i
i bh
yiP −+= βπ 1
)(   
Therefore, the formal firm problem is  
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
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⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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=
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−− β
θ
βπ
1
1
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1
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P
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The solution is characterized by 
y
b
Ph ii
ββ
β
β
βθ −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=
1
1
1*
)1(
 (8) 
** )( iihiy θ=  (9) 
** )1(
ii h
b
β
βπ −=  (10) 
Since the workers receive the fraction β/(1+β) of  out of wages w, we have )()( * iyip
whiyip i
** )()(
1
=+ β
β  which yields w = b. 
B.2 The informal firms 
 
When the technology productivity is not sufficiently high some firms have an incentive to 
move to the informal sector of the economy. Informal firms don't support the hiring costs of 
labor. Besides, they have an infinite bargaining power that forces workers to accept a 
predetermined wage w  which is lower than the wage offered in the formal sector bww =< . 
Indeed, workers are not organized in unions when they are hired by informal firms. However, 
becoming an informal firm lowers the technology productivity to its minimum level θ . This can 
be justified by the denied access to some public services for informal firms or by the necessity to 
support delocalization and additional transport costs. The informal firm chooses an employment 
level that maximizes its profit and its maximisation problem is given by 
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
=
−==
−− β
θ
ππ
1
1
)()(
)(
)(max
P
ipyiy
hiy
SC
h
hwyip
i
i
iiii
  
The solution is characterized by 
y
w
Phhi
β
β
β βθ −− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== 1
1
1
** ~~  (11) 
*** ~~ hyy θ==  (12) 
** ~)1(~ hwi β
βπ −=  (13) 
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A firm decides to move to informal activity if it provides it with a higher profit i.e. if  
**~
ii ππ > . Using (10) and (13) it is simple to show that this the case if the technology 
productivity is below a threshold θ~  given by  
( ) θβθθ β >+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= /11~
w
b   
Hence, all firms with a productivity in [ ]θθ ~,  become informal whereas firms having a 
productivity in [ ]θθ ,~  choose to be formal. Note that 0/~ >∂∂ bθ  which signifies that countries 
with weaker labor market institutions have larger informal sector. 
C. Labor market institutions and unemployment 
 
Proposition 1 
For a given institutional environment, allowing informal activity increases job creation. 
Proof 
Using equations (8) and (11) it is easy to show the following equation 
( ) ββθθ −== 1/** ˆ/~ ii hh  (14) 
where 
θβθθ β
β
~)1(ˆ /1
/1
>+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
w
b   
Hence, a firm i that belongs to the informal sector θθ ~<i  creates more jobs compared to 
a situation where it has no choice but producing as a formal firm. Indeed, from (14) we have 
**~
ihh >   // 
∫ ∫+= θθ θθ θθθθ
~
~
** )()(~ iiiii dfhdfhH   
Proposition 2 
i)  If the institutional environment is initially sufficiently weak: 
βββ /1)1( +=>
wbb  
then improving it (a reduction of b) enhances job creation ( ∂H / ∂b)<0  and reduces 
unemployment ( for a given number of potential workers). 
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ii)  If the institutional environment is initially sufficiently developed bb <  then reducing it (an 
increase of b) increases job creation ( ∂H / ∂b)>0  and reduces unemployment ( for a given 
number of potential workers). 
Proof: see the appendix. 
3. Simulations 
 
Calibrating the model using the unemployment data in the GCC countries between 1990 
and 2007 enables us to compare the results of the model to the effective evolution of the 
unemployment rate.  The sample countries and the data sources are presented in tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. We will present the methodology of the parameters calibration.  
The institutional environment is represented in this simulation by social insurance which 
is captured through oil prices. Hence, an increase in  oil prices is assumed to lead to higher social 
insurance and therefore to higher cost of hiring labour (b).  We choose the parameters in order to 
minimize the error between the effective unemployment rate (U) and the simulated 
unemployment rate (U’).  The effective unemployment rate is constructed as a weighted average 
of the unemployment rate of nationals and non-nationals. The weights are the shares of national 
and non-national labour-force in the GCC countries which are respectively assumed to equal 
26% and 74%1. 
Assuming that the labour supply is fixed (N) the simulated unemployment rate is given 
by 
N
HU t −=1   
Where H, as proved in the appendix of proposition 2, is given by  
)~(ˆˆ)1(~
)~(ˆ)1(~
1/11/11/
1/11/11/
ββββ
ββββ
θθθβθθ
θθθβθθβ
−−−
−−−
−−+−
−−+−=
w
H   
 
The parameters of the model are calculated to minimize the error U – U’. The results are 
the following: 
                                                           
1 GCC, STATISTICAL BULLETIN VOLUME‐TWELVE, 2003;  
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 The following figure presents the effective and the simulated unemployment rate with the oil 
price (divided by 10). 
 
Oil price
U : effective unemployment rate 
U’ : Simulated unemployment rate 
The figure shows that our model captures the effect of higher variation of the oil price on 
the unemployment rate.  Indeed, it replicates very well the decline in  unemployment rate after 
the acceleration of oil price during the period 2002-2007.  However, it is not very insightful 
before this period which means that other factors have caused unemployment  to decrease. The 
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paucity of the labor market data in the GCC makes the empirical investigation of these other 
variables difficult.  
Such simulation results amplify our second theoretical proposition 2. Interpreting, 
cautiously , proposition two, it elucidates that if social insurance is initially weak, then  its 
increase reduces the formal sector and enlarges the informal sector. The increase in Informal 
firms  creates more jobs than those lost by the remaining formal firms. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 This paper examines theoretically and empirically the relationship between social 
insurance, an important labor market institution, and unemployment in the GCC.  In the 
theoretical section the model elucidates the relationship the relationship between labor market 
institutions and unemployment in the formal and informal sectors of the economy.  Two 
propositions are pondered: (1) allowing informal activity bolsters  job creation, and (2) If the 
institutional environment is initially, sufficiently, weak, then mitigating it will lower 
unemployment. Simulating the model with the GCC’s unemployment for the period 1990-2007 
allows us to decipher the validity of the model.   The institutional environment is represented in 
this simulation by social insurance which is captured through oil prices. Hence, an increase in oil 
prices is assumed to lead to higher social insurance and, therefore ,to higher cost of hiring labour. 
The parameters are selected with the objective of  minimizing the error gap between the effective 
unemployment rate  and the simulated unemployment rate .  The effective unemployment rate is 
constructed as a weighted average of the unemployment rate of nationals and non-nationals. The 
weights are the shares of national and non-national labour-force in the GCC countries. 
Expositional simulations verified the second proposition. Thus, improving labor market 
institutions, that are initially weak may discernibly alleviate unemployment problems in   the 
GCC. 
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Table 1   List of Countries 
 
Countries 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
 
Table 2  Definitions of Variables  
Variable Name Definition Source 
Unemployment (U) Overall unemployment in the nation Ministries of planning and labor of the respective countries 
Social welfare 
(insurance) (SI) 
Social insurance proxied by oil 
prices See oil prices 
Oil prices Used as an instrumental variable and a proxy for social insurance U.S. Energy information Agency 
COL Cost of living Index World Bank Development Indicators (WB) 
GI Gini Index, Consumption or income Distribution WB 
INC Income (GNI) per capita WB 
Ed Education ( Adult Literacy) WB 
Prod productivity WB 
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Appendix 
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The production index can be written as following 
 
 
 
Using (8), (9), (11) et (12) and normalizing the revenue R to 1 (which yields P⁻¹=y) we obtain 
 
(19) 
From equation (14) we have 
 
 
replacing y by the expression given by (15) we obtain 
 
 
where 
 
 
Using the assumption that the distribution function is uniform over [ ]θθ , we obtain 
 
 
Or equivalently  
 
 
 
Using the following relation  
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H can be rewritten as follows 
 
 
Where g is defined by 
 
 
Note that g and       are decreasing with b whereas  is increasing with b. Analysing 
 it is simple to show that it is increasing in b if .  Note also that in 
this case, the numerator of H increases more with b due to the brake effect of   on g. Therefore 
we have all elements necessarily to show that H is decreasing  with b (∂H/∂b)<0.  Similarly if 
 we obtain (∂H/∂b)>0.  Finally, if the number of potential workers is given for example 
equal to N then the unemployment is given by U=N-H and (∂U/∂b)= - (∂H/∂b). 
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